II)
2. (C) Remi Marechaux, AF-advisor at the French presidency, discussed Madagascar on June 23, noting up front that « our policy is similar to yours and the international community’s — there must be a political consensus among the contending parties that will allow for credible elections. » Marechaux said that SADC’s recent shift in policy — its renunciation of reinstalling Ravalomanana by military means, its general re-alignment with the rest of the international community, and its naming of Joaquim Chissano as SADC mediator for Madagascar — was most helpful. Marechaux remarked that the next meeting of the International Contact Group should be in Antananarivo, which he said would demonstrate support for the new SADC mediator.
RAJOELINA
3. (C) That said, Marechaux said that outside pressure was necessary to prod the three main parties — Rajoelina, Ravalomanana, and Ratsiraka — into forming a consensus, In Marechaux’s view, each of them was responsible for the lack of progress. Rajoelina was surrounded by HAT hard-liners who would oppose an agreement and subsequent elections because this would ultimately lead to their losing power. Some of these hard-liners wanted to go it alone and form, in their view, a permanent government, regardless of internal and international opinion. Marechaux said that France had been advising the HAT camp not to pursue the hard-liners’ approach.
4. (C) Marechaux said that Rajoelina himself was not helping matters by remaining somewhat coy about his own intentions to run. Marechaux said that despite declarations that Rajoelina would not run and his promises not to amend the constitution to eliminate the age issue, it was not clear what Rajoelina’s intentions were. All of this was complicated by the « totally untransparent » prosecution and conviction of Ravalomanana and the prohibition against his running for office, which the HAT had handled in a completely clumsy manner. Marechaux thought that even if Rajoelina ran, it was not clear that he would win, given the concentration of his support in the capital and lack of it elsewhere. RAVALOMANANA
5. (C/NF) As for Ravalomanana, Marechaux said that he remained obsessed with making a come-back and being reinstalled in power, despite the « fantasy nature » of such an ambition. Marechaux confided that Ravalomanana was continuing to try to recruit mercenaries, including within France. Marechaux said that some of those in France whom Ravalomanana had attempted to recruit had contacted the GOF, in part because Ravalomanana, in making his sales pitch, had claimed that « the Elysee (i.e., French Presidency) is supporting me. » Marechaux said that the Presidency denied these claims and then referred Ravalomanana’s case to other branches of the GOF responsible for monitoring this kind of activity. Marechaux said the Presidency was not pleased that PARIS 00000848 002 OF 003 Ravalomanana was recruiting mercenaries in France or claiming that the French supported this activity.
6. (C) Marechaux said that assumptions that France was « anti-Ravalomanana » were much exaggerated. Ravalomanana might not like France much (although not enough, apparently, to refrain from claiming France supported him) but France had developed a modus operandi in dealing with him. He was helpful on Mayotte, which the French valued. Marechaux said that Rajoelina feared Ravalomanana’s return because Ravalomanana had sufficient personal wealth and resources to carry out a comprehensive campaign that Rajoelina would find difficult to counter, much less overcome. Marechaux commented that one of the HAT’s bad decisions was to shut down Ravalomanana’s extensive business empire, which resulted in sudden unemployment for many and thus a ready-made host of Ravalomanana supporters.